
Catastrophe!

Why we should care about the possibility of rare but catastrophic transport incidents



Summary

- 1.The rail industry and the research project
- 2.Our tolerance to risk
- 3.The SPACE Model
- 4.Wrap-up



If you think safety is expensive, try an accident

Dr Trevor Kletz







Background – The Rail Safety Regulator

- The Rail Safety Regulator is part of the Transport Agency
- We **oversee** the safety of all rail operators in NZ
 - Rail operators remain **accountable** for safety & managing risk
- Licensing, auditing, education, investigation & compliance
- Moving from a process-based regulator to a risk-based regulator.

Background – Why the focus on risk?

- Risk management is a key activity in the rail sector
 - Trains are big and hard. People aren't.
 - Potential for multi-fatality accidents & significant service disruption
- Rail companies must manage their own risks
 - *“Those creating the hazard are responsible for managing it”*
- Risk management is evolving in New Zealand
 - Increasingly complicated activities
 - Reliability is a customer focus
 - *“Everyone comes home healthy and safe”*



What is our risk tolerance?


- Risk management is not risk elimination
- You can't be absolutely “safe” – risk is a consequence of activity




- We need to describe a level where a risk is intolerable to our objectives

How safe – Value of Life Saved


- The current VSL is derived from a 1991 study
 - Asked 600 people
 - Willingness to pay for road safety improvements
 - This implicitly includes a degree of risk aversion



How safe – Valuation Methods for Life



How safe – What is the current standard?



Workers: 1 in 1000

Too high

- Industries in this range must reduce

Public: 1 in 10,000

Higher than in practice

- Less public pressure to reduce?



**1 in 10,000
for workers**

What impact does this have for other transport modes?

Space Model

Estimating fatality risks in New Zealand rail



- Recent incidents
- The challenge
- Model overview
- Method
- Discussion

Freight Accidents



The Challenge

- The problem of frequency:
 - small rail industry
 - relatively low incident counts
 - very few higher consequence events.
- Record keeping historically patchy.
 - 5 years of recent improved record



The Challenge

- Under these circumstances how can we develop a best estimate of the safety risks across both common and rare event types?




SPACE Risk Model

- This required a hybrid approach, drawing on New Zealand and international data, resulting in the SPACE model.
 - Safety
 - Performance
 - And
 - Casualty
 - Estimates




SPACE Methodology



* Average expected fatalities not estimated for passenger tunnel fire risk. This is a priority risk due to the maximum credible number of fatalities

SPACE Methodology




* Average expected fatalities not estimated for passenger tunnel fire risk. This is a priority risk due to the maximum credible number of fatalities

Short Stacking




SPACE Methodology



* Average expected fatalities not estimated for passenger tunnel fire risk. This is a priority risk due to the maximum credible number of fatalities

SPACE Methodology



* Average expected fatalities not estimated for passenger tunnel fire risk. This is a priority risk due to the maximum credible number of fatalities



Relevance to freight resilience

- Similar approach can be taken to modelling delays (both delays from safety risks and from other areas)
- Safety risks can lead to delay risks

Discussion

- Intent of modelling is to draw on best available data and apply most appropriate risk assessment approach.
- Builds a transparent and rational overview.
- Peer review and industry working group oversight.
- Tool for building consensus on main issues.
- Informing rational decision making.

Wrap-up – Questions and Comments?

